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Abstract
Following a series of ad hoc interventions throughout 2007 and early 2008, the collapse of
Lehman Brothers in the fall of 2008 and the resulting liquidity crisis caused the German
government to adopt a new framework for bank support. The Financial Market Support Act
established a new fund, the Financial Market Stabilization Fund (Sonderfonds
Finanzmarktstabilisierung, “SoFFin”), to provide up to €400 billion of guarantees on newly
issued unsubordinated debt instruments of German financial institutions and German
subsidiaries of foreign financial institutions. SoFFin also provided support through
recapitalizations and asset purchases, in addition to guarantees. The scheme was extended
multiple times before the issuance window closed initially on December 31, 2010. A
subsequent reactivation of the scheme in 2012 extended this issuance window to December
31, 2015. The total volume of guarantees provided through SoFFin peaked at €174 billion in
the third quarter of 2010. By the end of 2013, there were no guarantees outstanding and
none had been triggered. €2.15 billion in fees were collected as a result of the program.
Keywords: Credit guarantee scheme, interbank lending, SoFFin

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to bank debt guarantee programs.
1
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SoFFin Guarantee Scheme (Germany)
At a Glance
German banks began to experience losses from
the financial crisis in mid-2007 due to their
exposure to the subprime mortgage market in
the United States. This led the German
government to provide assistance on an ad hoc
basis to three banks throughout 2007 and early
2008. Once Lehman Brothers failed in
September 2008, causing significant liquidity
shortages in the interbank market, the German
government recognized the need for a
framework to preserve financial stability and
provide support to banks.
As a result, the German parliament passed the
Financial Market Stabilization Fund Act
(FMStFG) on October 18, 2008. FMStFG called
for a new fund, the Financial Market
Stabilization Fund (SoFFin). SoFFin would
provide support to distressed German financial
institutions
through
guarantees,
recapitalizations, and asset purchases.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To restore confidence and access to liquidity
amongst German lenders.
Announcement Date
Operational Date
Date of First
Guaranteed Loan
Issuance
Issuance Window
Expiration Date
Program Size
Usage
Outcomes

October 13, 2008
October 27, 2008
Unavailable
Originally until December 31,
2009; extended until
December 31, 2010 and later
December 31, 2015
Initially, €400 billion; later
temporarily reduced to €300
billion
Peaked at €174 billion
€2.15 billion in fees collected.
A substantial amount of the
guarantees was provided to
Hypo Real Estate, which was
nationalized in 2009
Part of a single fund for
granting guarantees,
providing recapitalizations
and making asset purchases

Funding for the guarantee program was
initially capped at €400 billion. Guarantees Notable Features
could be provided on interbank loans or bankissued debt with a maturity of 36 months or
less (60 months in exceptional circumstances)
issued by German financial institutions (including insurance companies and pension funds) or
German subsidiaries of foreign institutions. Germany imposed a fee based on debt maturity and the
risk profile of the issuing institution.
The German government extended the scheme multiple times, before the issuance window for new
guarantees initially closed on December 31, 2010. A subsequent reauthorization of the scheme in
2012 in response to the European sovereign debt crisis extended this window to December 31, 2015.
The total volume of guarantees peaked at €174 billion in the third quarter of 2010. No guarantee was
ever triggered in connection with the scheme, and the German government collected €2.15 billion in
fees.
Summary Evaluation
Assessments of SoFFin as a whole generally agree that a systematic framework was necessary and
that the program was successful in maintaining financial stability in Germany.
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SoFFin Guarantee Scheme: Germany Context
$3,431.2 billion in 2007
GDP
$3,742.6 billion in 2008
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in
LCU converted to USD)
Source: Bloomberg
$41,587 in 2007
GDP per capita
$45,427 in 2008
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in
LCU converted to USD)
Source: Bloomberg
As of Q4 2007:
Sovereign credit rating
Fitch: AAA
(5-year senior debt)
Moody’s: Aaau
S&P: AAA
As of Q4 2008:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaau
S&P: AAA

Size of banking system

Source: Bloomberg
$4,035.4 billion in total assets in 2007
$4,310.3 billion in total assets in 2008
Source: Bloomberg
117.6% in 2007
115.2% in 2008

Size of banking system
as a percentage of GDP

Source: Bloomberg
Size of banking system
as a percentage of
financial system
5-bank concentration of
banking system

Foreign involvement in
banking system

Government ownership
of banking system

Data not available
85.4% of total banking assets in 2007
85.6% of total banking assets in 2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development
Database
11% of total banking assets in 2007
12% of total banking assets in 2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development
Database
Data not available in 2007
35.4% of banks owned by the state in 2008
Source: World Bank Regulation & Supervision
Survey
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Existence of deposit
insurance

90% insurance up to $28,000 in 2007
100% insurance on deposits up to $133,333 in
2010
Source: World Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset;
OECD, “Financial Crisis: Deposit Insurance and
Related Financial Safety Net Aspects”
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Overview

Background
In late 2007 and early 2008, German financial institutions began to struggle as a result of
their exposure to the U.S. subprime mortgage market. During this period, the government
provided substantial support on an ad hoc basis to three banks: one medium-sized private
bank and two state-owned Landesbanken.3 This support took the form of capital injections,
credit lines, and guarantees (Hüfner 2010).
Throughout late 2007 and 2008, the interbank lending market faced increasing pressure.
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 caused interbank markets to dry up,
and banks across Europe faced liquidity crises. To address this, Euro-area countries
convened at an emergency summit on October 12, 2008. The summit resulted in a joint
action plan calling in part for national governments to “improve market functioning over
longer term maturities” through the introduction of guarantee programs for bank senior
debt issuance (Summit of the Euro Areas Countries 2008).
In Germany, the collapse of the interbank market caused Hypo Real Estate Group to run into
liquidity problems and the government began to worry that Hypo might fail. As a result, the
financial industry provided €50 billion in guarantees to Hypo in early October 2008, €35
billion of which was secured by a government re-guarantee (Bleuel 2009). At this point, the
German government recognized the severity of the crisis in the interbank market and the
limitations of providing support on an ad hoc basis and moved to create a systematic
framework for bank support (Bleuel 2009).
Program Description
On October 18, 2008, the German Parliament passed the Financial Market Stabilization Fund
Act (Finanzmarktstabilisierungsfondsgesetz, or FMStFG), which introduced a new
framework for financial stability. FMStFG established a Financial Market Stabilization Fund
(Sonderfonds Finanzmarktstabilisierung, or SoFFin) which would be administered by the
newly created Federal Agency for Financial Market Stabilization (Bundesanstalt für
Finanzmarktstabilisierung, or FMSA) (Pleister 2011). SoFFin could issue up to €100 billion
in debt to fund itself.
FMStFG allowed for three stabilization measures under SoFFin: guarantees,
recapitalizations, and asset purchases. FMStFG initially capped the total volume of
guarantees under SoFFin at €400 billion, and at €80 billion for capital support and asset
purchases combined (International Monetary Fund 2011). German financial institutions
(including insurance companies and pension funds), subsidiaries of foreign institutions, and
special purpose vehicles were eligible to receive guarantees. Eligible institutions had to
specifically request guarantees, which could be issued for interbank loans or bank-issued
debt. In order to be eligible, debt instruments were required to have a maturity of 36 months
3

IKB, WestLB, and SachsenLB.

703

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 2 Iss. 3

or less, though maturities of up to 60 months were eligible in special circumstances (Petrovic
and Tutsch 2009). The government does not appear to have established minimum maturity
requirements for eligible debt. FMStFG required that the German government charge a fee
for guarantees. The base fee was 50 basis points, and liabilities with a maturity greater than
one year were charged an additional fee based on the issuing institution’s credit default swap
(CDS) spread for senior debt issuance (European Commission 2008c). These fees were
increased by 20bps to 40bps in June 2010 consistent with European Commission guidance
calling for increased fees for programs extending beyond June 30, 2010 (European
Commission 2010).
Every participating institution was required to submit a business model for approval to the
German government. Upon review, SoFFin could stipulate that risky lines of business be
abandoned or curtailed (European Commission 2008c). In addition, institutions were
prohibited from advertising participation in the guarantee scheme in order to avoid
distorting competition with other banks (Petrovic and Tutsch 2009).
FMStFV, the statute detailing SoFFin, further stipulated that guarantees could only be
provided to solvent financial institutions. In practice, the German government restricted
participation to institutions with a Tier-1 ratio of at least 7%. Exceptions could be made only
if the institution in question committed to reaching the 7% threshold within three months
(European Commission 2008c).
The European Commission approved the SoFFin stabilization measures, ruling that though
they constituted State Aid, they were permitted under Article 87(3)(b) of the EC, which
permits State Aid that remedies a serious disturbance in a Member State’s economy
(European Commission 2008b).4
Both FMSA and SoFFin were intended to be temporary. The authority to issue guarantees
under SoFFin was supposed to expire by December 31, 2009, presuming the crisis lasted that
long (European Commission 2008b). As German banks continued to face difficulties
accessing funding on the capital markets, Germany applied to the EC to extend the SoFFin
rescue measures multiple times. The EC approved these extensions until the window for
issuing guarantees under SoFFin initially closed on December 31, 2010 (European
Commission 2010). A subsequent reauthorization of the scheme in 2012 in response to the
European sovereign debt crisis ultimately resulted in the issuance window being extended
until December 31, 2015.
Outcomes
FMStFG initially capped the total volume of guarantees through SoFFin at €400 billion, and
over the course of its existence the total volume peaked at €174 billion in the third quarter
of 2010 (International Monetary Fund 2011). The total volume of guarantees over time can

Note that once the treaty was renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on
December 1, 2009, the relevant state aid provision was renumbered to Article 107(3)(b). Later decisions on
extensions regarding SoFFin referenced the new article numbers.
4
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be seen in Figure 1 below. A substantial amount of the guarantees was provided to Hypo Real
Estate, which was nationalized in 2009 (represented in Figure 1 as “Guarantees to
HRE/FMS”).
Figure 1: Guarantees by SoFFin, 2008-2010

Source: International Monetary Fund 2011.
When the window for issuing guarantees initially closed at the end of 2010, only €64
billion of guarantees remained (International Monetary Fund 2011). By the end of 2013,
there were no guarantees outstanding and none had been triggered. Over the course of the
scheme, the German government collected €2.15 billion in fees for guarantees under
SoFFin (Detzer and Hein 2016).

II. Key Design Decisions
1. The SoFFin guarantee scheme was part of a package passed by the German
government in response to the financial crisis.
The German government passed a package of crisis response measures, which entered into
force on October 18, 2008. The backbone of the package was SoFFin, which was permitted
to assume guarantees, inject capital, and temporarily acquire assets (FMStFG 2008).
2. The Financial Market Stabilization Fund Act provided authority to grant
guarantees.
The Financial Market Stabilization Fund Act (Finanzmarktstabilisierungsfondsgesetz, or
FMStFG) established the Financial Market Stabilization Fund (Sonderfonds
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Finanzmarktstabilisierung, or SoFFin) on October 17, 2008. Section 6 of FMStFG specifically
authorized SoFFin to provide guarantees (FMStFG 2008).
3. The European Commission approved the SoFFin guarantee scheme under Article
87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty.
On October 27, 2008, the European Commission (EC) ruled that guarantees provided by
SoFFin were allowed under Article 87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty, which permits state aid to
“remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State” (European Commission
2008b). Following a number of early amendments to the scheme, most of which concerned
the recapitalization scheme, the German government re-notified the EC of the scheme and a
new decision was announced on December 12, 2008, which replaced the initial approval.
The new decision also permitted the guarantees under Article 87(3)(b) (European
Commission 2008c). As discussed in more detail below, the need to structure the Guarantee
Scheme in such a way as to ensure EC approval significantly influenced the design of certain
program features.
4. FMStFG initially capped the volume of guarantees SoFFin could provide at €400
billion.
According to FMStFG, the total volume of guarantees SoFFin could provide was capped at
€400 billion. This amount was specifically separated from the cap for SoFFin’s
recapitalization measures and asset purchases, which was set at €80 billion for both
measures combined (FMStFG 2008).
The amount of guarantees that could be issued by SoFFin was temporarily reduced to €300
billion in connection with the reauthorization of the scheme in 2012.
5. SoFFin acted as a fund to finance bank support measures including the guarantee.
SoFFin could issue up to €100 billion in debt to fund itself.
In addition to establishing SoFFin, FMStFG also established the Federal Agency for Financial
Market Stabilization (Bundesanstalt für Finanzmarktstabilisierung, or FMSA) to manage
SoFFin. When FMStFG was passed, the FMSA was established as a legally dependent
institution in Germany’s central bank, Deutsche Bundesbank. In July 2009, the FMSA became
an independent institution under the Federal Ministry of Finance (FMSA n.d.). According to
the IMF, the FMSA is now an independent organization under the Bundesrepublik
Deutschland-Finanzagentur GmbH and under the supervision of the Federal Ministry of
Finance (BMF). Decisions are subject to scrutiny by the BMF. The BMF reports the FMSA’s
activity to a committee of the German parliament (International Monetary Fund 2011).
6. German financial institutions (including insurance companies and pension funds),
German subsidiaries of foreign institutions, and special purpose vehicles were
allowed to obtain guarantees through SoFFin provided that they met minimum
capital requirements.
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FMStFG permitted FMSA and SoFFin to provide guarantees to German financial institutions
(including insurance companies and pension funds) and German subsidiaries of foreign
financial institutions, and to special purpose vehicles that had assumed the risk positions of
an eligible institution (FMStFG 2008). Stolz and Wedow suggest that the ability to transfer
securities to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) in exchange for bonds issued by the SPV and
guaranteed by SoFFin would allow an institution to hold government-guaranteed bonds
instead of volatile assets on its balance sheet, reducing capital requirements. They conclude
that this scheme would serve two purposes: providing institutions with collateral that could
in turn be used to access central bank liquidity, and freeing up capital (2010).5
FMStFV, the statute detailing SoFFin, further stipulated that guarantees could only be
provided to solvent financial institutions. In practice, the German government restricted
participation to institutions with a Tier-1 capital ratio of at least 7%. Exceptions could be
made only if the institution in question committed to reaching the 7% threshold within three
months (European Commission 2008c).
In order to receive a guarantee through SoFFin, an eligible institution had to request
stabilization measures. Section 4 of FMStFG stipulated that there was “no legal entitlement
to benefits of the fund,” and that stabilization measures, including guarantees, would only be
approved once the Federal Ministry for Finance assessed “the significance of the respective
financial-sector enterprise covered by the Stabilization measure to financial-market
stability, the urgency and the principle of the most effective and economical deployment of
Fund resources possible” (FMStFG 2008).
7. SoFFin could provide guarantees for newly issued unsubordinated debt
instruments.
Under the SoFFin framework, the German government could provide guarantees for new
bonds and liabilities, including debt capital and non-Tier 1 and -Tier 2 capital (European
Commission 2008c). Covered bonds were also eligible.
8. Initially, the maturity for eligible liabilities was capped at 36 months, or 60 months
in exceptional circumstances.
When the guarantee scheme began, eligible liabilities were required to have a maturity of 36
months or less (European Commission 2008c). The Financial Markets Stabilization
Amendment Act (Finanzmarktstabilisierungsergänzungsgesetz, “FMStErgG”), passed in
April 2009, lengthened this maturity limit and allowed SoFFin to guarantee liabilities with a
maturity of up to 60 months (FMSA n.d.). According to the amended act, guarantees could be
granted for liabilities with a maturity of over 36 months, “only in justified, exceptional cases
and for a maximum of one third of the guarantees granted to an enterprise” (FMStFG 2008).

No guarantees were ever provided to special purpose vehicles (Pleister 2011); for more information on the
rules governing guarantees to special purpose vehicles, see Stolz and Wedow 2010.
5
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The government does not appear to have established minimum maturity requirements for
eligible debt.
In connection with the reauthorization of the scheme in 2012, covered bonds with maturities
of up to 84 months became eligible.
9. There does not appear to have been any restrictions on the currency of eligible
liabilities.
Program documents do not specify any restrictions on the currencies eligible to participate
in the scheme.
10. There does not appear to have been a participation limit imposed on financial
institutions.
Program documents do not specify any limitations on an individual institution’s
participation in the scheme.
11. Participants were charged a fee for guarantees based on maturity of debt and
creditworthiness.
FMStFG stipulated that a fee would be charged for guarantees, and FMStV enumerated the
fee structure, which aligned with recommendations from the European Central Bank issued
on October 20, 2008. The base annual fee was 50 basis points; liabilities with a term of over
a year were charged a risk premium that corresponded to the participating institution’s CDS
spread for senior debt, which cannot be less than the median of the financial institution’s
five-year credit default swap spread between January 1, 2007, and August 31, 2008
(European Commission 2008c). In other words, the fees would be calculated as follows:
𝐹𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 = 𝐺𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 × (𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑒𝑒 + 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝑒𝑒)

Participating institutions providing collateral to SoFFin in connection with the issuance of a
guarantee could have the base fee reduced from 50 bps to 25 bps.
As conditions improved, Germany increased these fees in order to incentivize banks to scale
back and ultimately end their participation in the scheme. Fees were increased by 20 basis
points for banks with a rating of A+ or A, 30 basis points for banks rated A-, and 40 basis
points for banks rated below A- (European Commission 2010). This met a stipulation by the
EC that no extensions to guarantee schemes would be approved beyond June 30, 2010,
unless the fees were increased above the 2008 guidelines (Stolz and Wedow 2010).
12. Participating institutions had to agree to a number of conditions, including
oversight of business models by German authorities and restrictions on marketing.
Guidance issued by the European Commission in October 2008 on the creation of credit
guarantee programs called for the inclusion in programs of a set of safeguards “to
minimize…distortions and the potential abuse of the preferential situations of beneficiaries
brought about by a State guarantee” and “to avoid moral hazard.” This guidance did not
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specify exactly what safeguards a program should include, but required “an adequate
combination” of elements including restrictions on advertising based on the guarantee,
balance sheet growth, share buybacks and executive compensation (European Commission
2008a).
By participating in the SoFFin guarantee scheme, institutions agreed to a number of
conditions. Every participating institution was required to submit a business model for
approval to the German government. Upon review, SoFFin could stipulate that risky lines of
business be abandoned or curtailed (European Commission 2008c). In addition, institutions
were prohibited from advertising participation in the guarantee scheme in order to avoid
distorting competition with other banks (Petrovic and Tutsch 2009).
German authorities abandoned as unnecessary an initial proposal that participants agree to
restrictions on balance-sheet growth. Certain other conditions such as restrictions on
compensation that applied to SoFFin’s recapitalization scheme did not apply to the
guarantee program.
13. The issuance window was initially slated to close on December 31, 2009, but was
extended until December 31, 2010, and, following a reauthorization of the
program in 2012, until December 31, 2015.
According to FMStFG, guarantees could only be issued until December 31, 2009. However,
that end date was conditional on the crisis lasting that long and the German government
retained the power to close the issuance window early (European Commission 2008c).
Though the German government was hopeful that improved conditions in the interbank
market would render the guarantee scheme unnecessary by the end of 2009, FMStFG
recognized that any prolongations of the scheme would need to be approved in accordance
with State Aid rules. The EC required that they be notified six months before any extension
of the scheme (European Commission 2008c). In fact, the scheme, with amendments, was
extended and approved by the EC multiple times before the issuance window closed initially
on December 31, 2010.

III. Evaluation
Although not focused on the guarantee scheme specifically, assessments of the FMSA and
SoFFin are generally positive and argue that the stabilization measures were effective at
maintaining financial stability in Germany. Pleister argues that the concerted State
assistance framework, as opposed to the earlier ad hoc interventions, was successful in
rescuing German banks and “buttressed system stability over the short term,” (2011). In a
technical note assessing Germany’s crisis management arrangements, the IMF similarly
noted that the availability of guarantees through SoFFin and FMSA successfully relieved
funding constraints on the interbank market (2011).
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Legal/Regulatory Guidance
European Commission Decision October 27, 2008 (C(2008) 6422) – EC initial approval of
SoFFin.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/European_Commission_Deci
sion_October_27_2008_(C(2008)%206422)_0.pdf.
European Commission Decision December 12, 2008 (C(2008) 8629 fin) – EC approval of
amended
SoFFin.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/European_Commission_Deci
sion_December_12_2008_(C(2008)%208629%20fin).pdf.
European Commission Decision June 23, 2010 (C(2010)4261 final) – final EC approval of
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of
SoFFin
until
December
31,
2010.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/European_Commission_Deci
sion_June_23_2010_(C(2010)4261%20final).pdf.
Press Releases/Announcements
Fund for the Stabilization of the Financial Market starts its operations in Germany
(10/27/2008) – press release announcing that SoFFin has commenced operation.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Fund_for_the_Stabilization_
of_the_Financial_Market_starts_its_operations_in_Germany.pdf.
Key Academic Papers
The German banking system and the global financial crisis: causes, developments and policy
responses (Bleuel 2009) – paper providing context for financial crisis in Germany and
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policy
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https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Bleuel_2009.pdf.

SoFFin.

The Federal Agency for Financial Market Stabilisation in Germany: from Rescuing to
Restructuring (Pleister 2011) – paper examining the creation of FMSA and its role during the
crisis. https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Pleister_2011.pdf.
Financialisation and the crises in the export-led mercantilist German economy (Detzer and
Hein 2016) – paper examining German financial sector and crisis; see in particular section 4.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Detzer_and_Hein_2016.pdf.
The Design of Government Guarantees for Bank Bonds: Lessons for the Recent Financial
Crisis (Levy and Schich 2010) – comparative study of guarantee programs during the crisis.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Levy_and_Schich_2010_0.pd
f.
Reports/Assessments
Germany: Technical Note on Crisis Management Arrangements – IMF assessment of
Germany’s response to the financial crisis and new preventative measures implemented in the
wake
of
the
crisis.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Germany%20Technical%20
Note%20on%20Crisis%20Management%20Arrangements%20(IMF%202011).pdf.
Extraordinary measures in extraordinary times – public measures in support of the financial
sector in the EU and the United States – discussion paper published by German central bank
comparing responses to the crisis in the EU (with a particular focus on Germany) and responses
in
the
US
and
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effectiveness.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Extraordinary_measures_in
_extraordinary_times_public_measures_in_support_of_the_financial_sector_in_the_EU_and_t
he_United_States.pdf.
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